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4. What we informationally owe each other 
Abstract: One important criticism of algorithmic systems is that they lack transparency. Such 
systems can be opaque because they are complex, protected by patent or trade secret, or 
deliberately obscure. In the EU, there is a debate about whether the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) contains a “right to explanation,” and if so what such a right entails. Our 
task in this chapter is to address this informational component of algorithmic systems. We argue 
that information access is integral for respecting autonomy, and transparency policies should be 
tailored to advance autonomy.  
To make this argument we distinguish two facets of agency (i.e., capacity to act). The first is 
practical agency, or the ability to act effectively according to one’s values. The second is what 
we call cognitive agency, which is the ability to exercise what Pamela Hieronymi calls 
“evaluative control” (i.e., the ability to control our affective states, such as beliefs, desires, and 
attitudes). We argue that respecting autonomy requires providing persons sufficient information 
to exercise evaluative control and properly interpret the world and one’s place in it. We draw this 
distinction out by considering algorithmic systems used in background checks, and we apply the 
view to key cases involving risk assessment in criminal justice decisions and K-12 teacher 
evaluation.  
 
In chapter 2, we articulated our conception of autonomy. We argued for a lightweight, 
ecumenical approach that encompasses both psychological and personal autonomy. In chapter 3, 
we drew on this account to set out conditions that are crucial in determining whether algorithmic 
decision systems respect persons’ autonomy. Specifically, we argued that algorithmic decision 
systems are justifiable to the extent that people subject to them can reasonably endorse them. 
Whether people can reasonably endorse those systems turns on conditions of reliability, 
responsibility, stakes, and relative burden. 
Notice, though, that the conditions set out in chapter 3 are primarily about how those 
systems threaten persons’ material conditions, such as whether teachers are fired based on 
evaluation systems and whether defendants are subject to more stringent conditions based on risk 
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assessment systems. But people are not just passive subjects of algorithmic systems—or at least 
they ought not to be—and whether use of a system is justifiable overall turns on more than the 
material consequences of its use. 
In this chapter we will argue that there is a distinct informational component to 
respecting autonomy. Specifically, we owe people certain kinds of information and informational 
control. To get a basic sense of why, consider our understanding of autonomy from chapter two, 
which has two broad facets. Psychological autonomy includes conditions of competence 
(including epistemic competence) and authenticity. Personal autonomy includes procedural and 
substantive independence, which at root demand space and support for a person to think, plan, 
and operate. Further, as we explain in chapter 2, whether agents are personally autonomous turns 
on the extent to which they are capable of incorporating their values into important facets of their 
lives. Respecting an agent’s autonomy requires that one not deny her what she needs to 
incorporate her values into important facets of her life. It is a failure of respect to prevent agents 
from exercising their autonomy, and it is wrongful to do so without sufficiently good reason. 
Incorporating one's values into important facets of one's life requires that one have access to 
relevant information. That is, autonomy requires having information important to one’s life, and 
respecting autonomy requires not denying agents that information (and at times making it 
available). Algorithmic decision systems are often built in a way that prevents people from 
understanding their operations.1 This may, at least under certain circumstances, preclude 
persons’ access to information to which they have a right.     
 
1 Frank Pasquale (2016) argues that lack of transparency is one of the defining features and key concerns of 
technological “black boxes” that exert control over large swaths of contemporary life. Such obscurity can derive 
from many sources, including technological complexity, legal protections via intellectual property, and deliberate 
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That is the broad contour of our argument. Our task in the rest of the chapter is to fill that 
argument in. We’ll begin by describing two new cases, each involving background checks, and 
analyzing those cases using the Reasonable Endorsement Test we develop in chapter 3. We then 
explain important facets of autonomy that are missing from the analysis. To address that gap, we 
distinguish several different modes of agency, including practical and cognitive agency. We 
argue that individuals have rights to information about algorithmic systems in virtue of their 
practical and cognitive agency. Next, we draw on some scholarship surrounding a so-called 
“right to explanation” in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and how 
those relate to our understanding of cognitive and practical agency. Finally, we then apply our 
criteria to our polestar cases.  
To be clear, we are not arguing that individuals have a right to all information that is 
important in understanding their lives, incorporating their values into important decisions, and 
exercising agency. Rather, we argue that they have some kind of defeasible claim to such 
information. Our task here is to explain the basis for that claim, the conditions under which it 
creates obligations on others to respect, and the types of information the moral claims 
underwrite. A recent report on ethics in AI systems states, “Emphasis on algorithmic 
transparency assumes that some kind of ‘explainability’ is important to all kinds of people, but 
there has been very little attempt to build up evidence on which kinds of explanations are 
 
obfuscation. For our purposes the source of obscurity is initially less important than what autonomy demands. The 
source will become important when evaluating what duties people have to provide information as a matter of 
respecting others’ autonomy. 
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desirable to which people in which contexts.”2 We hope to contribute to this issue with an 
argument about what information is warranted. 
4.1. The misfortunes of Catherine Taylor and Carmen Arroyo 
Let’s begin by considering two new cases.  
Arkansas resident Catherine Taylor was denied a job at the Red Cross. Her rejection 
letter came with a nasty surprise. Her criminal background report included a criminal charge for 
intent to manufacture and sell methamphetamines.3 But Taylor had no criminal history. The 
system had confused her with Illinois resident Catherine Taylor, who had been charged with 
intent to manufacture and sell methamphetamines.4 
Arkansas Catherine Taylor wound up with a false criminal charge on her report because 
ChoicePoint (now a part of LexisNexis), the company providing the report, relied on bulk data to 
produce an “instant” result when checking her background.5 This is a common practice. 
Background screening companies such as ChoicePoint generate reports through automated 
processes that run searches through large databases of aggregated data, with minimal (if any) 
manual overview or quality control. ChoicePoint actually had enough accurate information—
such as Taylor’s address, Social Security number, and credit report—to avoid tarnishing her 
 
2 Jess Whittlestone et al., “Ethical and Societal Implications of Algorithms, Data, and Artificial Intelligence: A 
Roadmap for Research” (London: The Nuffield Foundation, 2019), 12. 
3 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy, 1st 
ed. (New York: Crown, 2016). 
4 Persis S. Yu and Sharon M. Dietrich, “Broken Records: How Errors by Criminal Background Checking 
Companies Harm Workers and Businesses” (National Consumer Law Center, April 11, 2012). 
5 Yu and Dietrich. 
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reputation with mistakes.6 Unfortunately for Taylor, the product ChoicePoint used in her case 
simply wasn’t designed to access that information.7 
ChoicePoint compounded the failure by refusing to rectify its mistake. The company said 
it could not alter the sources from which it draws data. So, if another business requested an 
“instant” report on Arkansas Catherine Taylor, the report would include information on Illinois 
Catherine Taylor.8  
This is not the only occasion on which Arkansas Taylor (of Arkansas) would suffer this 
kind of error. Soon after learning about the ChoicePoint mix-up, she found at least ten other 
companies who were providing inaccurate reports about her. One of those companies, Tenant 
Tracker, conducted a criminal background check for Taylor’s application for federal housing 
assistance that was even worse than ChoicePoint’s check. Tenant Tracker included the charges 
against Illinois Catherine Taylor and also included a separate set of charges against a person with 
a different name, Chantel Taylor (of Florida).9 
Taylor’s case is not special. Another background screening case involving a slightly 
different technology shows similar problems. It is common for background screeners to offer 
products that go beyond providing raw information on a subject and produce an algorithmically 
generated judgement in the form of a score or some other kind of recommendation. 
“CrimSAFE,” which was developed by CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC (CoreLogic), 
 
6 Yu and Dietrich. 
7 Yu and Dietrich citing Deposition of Teresa Preg at 63-64. 
8 Yu and Dietrich. 
9 O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. 
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is one such product.10 CrimSAFE is used to screen tenants. CoreLogic markets it as an 
“automated tool” that “processes and interprets criminal records and notifies leasing staff when 
criminal records are found that do not meet the criteria you establish for your community.”11 
When a landlord or property manager uses CrimSAFE to screen a tenant, CoreLogic 
delivers a report that indicates whether CrimSAFE has turned up any disqualifying records.12 But 
the report does not indicate what those allegedly disqualifying records are or any information 
about them (such as their dates, natures, or outcomes). To reiterate, the report only states whether 
disqualifying records have been found, not what they are. CoreLogic provides neither the 
purchaser nor the subject of the report any of the underlying details.13 
Let’s now look at a particular case involving CrimSAFE. In July of 2015, Carmen 
Arroyo’s son Mikhail suffered an accident that left him unable to speak, walk, or care for 
himself.14 Carmen was Mikhail’s primary caregiver, and she wanted to have Mikhail move in 
with her when he was discharged from treatment. For Mikhail to move into his mother’s 
apartment, he had to be screened by her complex, and so the complex manager had CoreLogic 
screen Mikhail using CrimSAFE.15 
 
10 Ariel Nelson, “Broken Records Redux: How Errors by Criminal Background Check Companies Continue to Harm 
Consumers Seeking Jobs and Housing” (Boston, MA: National Consumer Law Center, December 6, 2019). 
11 Nelson. See also Connecticut Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 
2020). 
12 Nelson, “Broken Records Redux: How Errors by Criminal Background Check Companies Continue to Harm 
Consumers Seeking Jobs and Housing.” 
13 Nelson. 
14 Nelson. 
15 Nelson. 
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CoreLogic returned a report to the apartment complex manager indicating that Mikhail 
was not fit for tenancy, based on his criminal record.16 The report did not specify the date, 
nature, or outcome of any criminal charges on Mikhail’s record. Further, Mikhail had never been 
convicted of a crime. Despite being unaware of the date, nature, or outcome of the alleged 
criminal conduct—and without taking into consideration the question of whether Mikhail was at 
that point even capable of committing the crimes he had been accused of—the manager adopted 
CoreLogic’s conclusion and denied Mikhail tenancy.17 Hence, Carmen Arroyo was unable to 
move her severely injured son into her apartment where she could provide the care he needed. 
Taylor and the Arroyos have suffered serious harms. And knowing the causes of their 
misfortunes is of little help in reversing those misfortunes. Decisions based on faulty criminal 
background reports are rarely overturned after those reports are identified as faulty.18 As the 
National Consumer Law Center puts it, “you can’t unring the bell.”19 
Taylor learned of the problems with her background as her tribulations unfolded. Arroyo 
learned of the problem only after being denied the key thing she needed to support her son, 
though she did eventually learn the reasons for Mikhail being denied tenancy. Many who are 
denied housing or employment through automated screening do not ever learn why.20  
 
16 Nelson. 
17 Nelson. 
18 Yu and Dietrich, “Broken Records: How Errors by Criminal Background Checking Companies Harm Workers 
and Businesses.” 
19 Yu and Dietrich. 
20 For further discussion of background check algorithms and lack of regulation and oversight, see Lauren Kirchner 
and Matthew Goldstein, “Access Denied: Faulty Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters,” May 28, 
2020, https://themarkup.org/locked-out/2020/05/28/access-denied-faulty-automated-background-checks-freeze-out-
renters. 
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  One reason people do not find out is that under U.S. law, consumer reporting agencies 
(companies that provide reports on consumers, such as background checks) do not have to tell 
the subjects of background checks that they are being screened. The relevant statute in this 
context is the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which requires either notification or the 
maintenance of strict procedures to ensure that the information is complete and up to date.21 This 
leaves reporting agencies the legal option of leaving the subjects of background searches out of 
the loop.  
Further, many companies that provide background checks maintain that they are not 
consumer reporting agencies at all. So, they maintain that the FCRA does not apply to them. As a 
result, they neither notify subjects of background checks nor maintain the strict procedures 
necessary to ensure the information in their systems is complete and up to date. One of the 
companies responsible for disseminating false information about Catherine Taylor, 
PublicData.com, simply denies that it is a consumer reporting agency.22 When Taylor notified 
PublicData.com of the errors it had made about her, they were unwilling to do anything to 
correct the errors.23 This was a matter of company policy, which is explicit that it “will NOT 
modify records in any database upon notification of inaccuracies.”24 
 
21 91st United States Congress, “An Act to Amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to Require Insured Banks to 
Maintain Certain Records, to Require That Certain Transactions in U.S. Currency Be Reported to the Department of 
the Treasury, and for Other Purposes.,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681 § (1970); Yu and Dietrich, “Broken Records: How Errors 
by Criminal Background Checking Companies Harm Workers and Businesses.” 
22 Yu and Dietrich, “Broken Records: How Errors by Criminal Background Checking Companies Harm Workers 
and Businesses.” 
23 Yu and Dietrich. 
24 Yu and Dietrich. 
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FCRA also requires employers using background checks to disclose that they will be 
doing background checks and to notify a candidate if adverse action may be taken in response to 
a background check.25 However, employers often do not comply with notice requirements.26 
4.1.1. Taylor, Arroyo, and the Reasonable Endorsement Test 
One way to understand Taylor’s and the Arroyos’ situations is in the terms we spell out in 
chapter 3, namely whether the background reporting systems are ones that people subject to them 
can reasonably endorse. Both Taylor and Arroyo have experienced considerable material burdens 
based on algorithmically aided decision systems. Both were held to account by systems that are 
based on factors for which Taylor and Arroyo are not responsible, and the stakes in each case are 
high. Hence, one could make the case that the reporting systems are ones that individuals subject 
to them cannot reasonably endorse as comporting with their material interests. Such an analysis, 
while compelling, would not be complete.  
Something has gone wrong in the Taylor and Arroyo cases beyond the fact that they were 
materially harmed. This separate consideration is an informational wrong. Taylor and Arroyo did 
not know (at least initially) what information in their files led to their background check results. 
Arroyo did not discover the basis for Mikhail’s check until it was too late to do anything 
meaningful about it. Taylor lost opportunities before she discovered the reason. Further, in 
Taylor’s case, several companies providing the misinformation would not fix their files upon 
 
25 91st United States Congress, An Act to amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require insured banks to 
maintain certain records, to require that certain transactions in U.S. currency be reported to the Department of the 
Treasury, and for other purposes. 
26 Yu and Dietrich, “Broken Records: How Errors by Criminal Background Checking Companies Harm Workers 
and Businesses.” 
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learning that they had made a mistake. Finally, both Taylor and Arroyo were in left in the dark as 
to how, exactly, the results came out the way they did; they were not afforded an understanding 
of the systems that cost them the opportunities they had sought.  
Arroyo has an additional, distinctive complaint. When her son’s application was rejected, 
the apartment complex did not know the details of the disqualifying conduct because CoreLogic 
did not supply them. This means that Arroyo was not given enough information about Mikhail’s 
rejection to even contest the claim. Compare Arroyo’s case with Taylor’s. Taylor at least knew 
that her file had contained a false drug charge. Knowing what she had been accused of informed 
her that she had to prove what she hadn’t done. Arroyo lacked even that.  
We have mentioned that there is at least some regulation that attempts to address these 
sorts of issues and that there is plausibly a question as to whether CoreLogic complies with its 
legal obligations under FCRA (as stated above, companies do not always follow the notification 
requirement). Could full compliance with FCRA bring about practices that Taylor and Arroyo 
could reasonably endorse? Again, we think not. For one, FCRA does not specify when subjects 
are owed notification.27 So, the notification requirement can be met without actually affording 
data subjects the underlying thing that really matters: time to effectively respond to any false or 
misleading information in their files and an understanding of where they stand with respect to 
decisions made about them. These are the claims we address in the following section.  
 
27 Yu and Dietrich. 
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4.2. Two arguments for informational rights 
Surely the Taylor and Arroyo cases grate on our intuitions, both because of the harms resulting 
from their background checks and the fact that each was in the dark about those checks. Such 
intuitions, however, can only take us so far. We need an argument to explain the wrongs 
adequately. Our argument is that persons’ autonomy interests have a substantial informational 
component that is distinct from the material components we argue for in chapter 3. Specifically, 
respecting the autonomy of persons subject to algorithmic decision systems requires ensuring 
that they have a degree of cognitive access to information about those systems. 
Agency refers to action and the relationship between a person (or other entity) and 
actions that are in some sense attributable to that person. That relationship may be merely causal 
(as when a person hands over their wallet at gunpoint), it may be freely willed, it may be 
deliberately planned, or it may be something else. Hence, agency is broader than autonomy, for a 
person may be an agent but neither psychologically nor personally autonomous. However, 
agency is morally important in that persons have claims to exercise agency (and to have room to 
exercise agency) in light of their (capacity) autonomy. On the relationship between autonomy 
and agency, Oshana writes: “An autonomous person is an agent—one who directs or determines 
the course of her own life and who is positioned to assume the costs and the benefits of her 
choices.”28 We return to the relationship between agency and autonomy, and the relation of both 
to conceptions of freedom, in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
28 Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society, 1st ed. (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 
2006), vii.  
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To make our case, we first need to distinguish two aspects of agency. At base, agency is 
the capacity (or effective exercise of the capacity) to act. And agents are beings with such 
capacity.29 There is substantial philosophical controversy surrounding conceptions and 
metaphysics of agency (e.g., whether it is simply a causal relation between an actor and event, 
whether agency requires intentionality, the degree to which non-humans may be agents). We can 
leave many of those to the side so that we can focus on agency with respect to action and mental 
states. 
The most familiar facet of agency is the ability to act physically in a relatively 
straightforward way, for example taking a walk, preparing a meal, or writing an email. A more 
complex exercise of agency involves taking actions that institute a plan or that realize one's 
values (which is to say, exercise agency in such a way that doing so successfully instantiates 
one’s psychological autonomy). Call this “practical agency.” Exercising practical agency so that 
it is consistent with one’s preferences and values requires a great deal of information and 
understanding. So, for example, if it's important to a person to build a successful career, then it is 
important for her to understand how her profession and her organization function, how to get to 
work, how to actually perform tasks assigned, and so forth. And if that person's supervisor fails 
to make available information that is relevant to her job performance, the supervisor fails to 
respect the person's practical agency because doing so creates a barrier to the employee 
incorporating her values into an important facet of her life. Notice that this understanding of 
practical agency shares similar foundations to the substantive independence requirement of 
 
29 Sven Nyholm puts it like this: “agency is a multidimensional concept that refers to the capacities and activities 
most centrally related to performing actions, making decisions, and taking responsibility for what we do.” Sven 
Nyholm, Humans and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism (London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2020), 31.   
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personal autonomy outlined in chapter 2. Being denied important information about the 
practicalities of planning and living one’s life undermines the degree to which one has 
substantive independence from others. 
The importance of information to exercising agency does not solely depend on agents’ 
abilities to use information to guide actions. A second aspect of agency is the ability to 
understand important facets of one's life. Call this “cognitive agency.” The distinction between 
practical agency and cognitive agency tracks Pamela Hieronymi’s view that ordinary intentional 
agency, in which we exercise control over actions—deciding to take a walk, deciding to prepare 
a meal—is distinct from “mental agency” (although we use ‘cognitive agency,’ the notion is the 
same). Mental agency, Hieronymi explains, is the capacity to exercise evaluative control over 
our mental states (e.g., our attitudes, beliefs, desires, and reactive responses). The difference 
between ordinary intentional agency and mental agency is the difference between an actor 
deciding “whether to do” (i.e., whether to take some action in the world beyond oneself) and the 
actor deciding “whether to believe.” Hieronymi’s view is that agents indeed exercise control—to 
some degree, and within important limits—over how they respond mentally to their 
circumstances. The scope of one’s evaluative control over one’s mental states and the extent to 
which one can exercise it effectively are less important to our project than recognizing the 
domain of cognitive agency.30 
Cognitive agency grounds moral claims in much the same way as practical agency. 
Respecting persons as autonomous requires that they be able to incorporate their sense of value 
 
30 For a similar division of aspects of our agency and discussion, see Michael Smith, “A Constitutivist Theory of 
Reasons: Its Promise and Parts,” Law, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (December 1, 2013): 9–30. 
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into decisions about conducting their lives as a matter of practical agency. Similarly, respecting 
persons as autonomous requires that they be able to incorporate their sense of value into how 
they understand the world and their place in it. As Thomas Hill, Jr. has argued, deception is an 
affront to autonomy regardless of whether that deception changes how one acts because it 
prevents persons from properly interpreting the world; even a benevolent lie that spares another's 
feelings can be an affront because it thwarts that person's ability to understand her situation.31 
We can extend Hill's argument beyond active deception. Denying agents information relevant to 
important facets of their lives can circumvent their ability to understand their situation just as 
much as deceit.32 In other words, deceit circumvents persons’ epistemic competence and may 
render their desires and beliefs inauthentic. 
One might question here whether practical and cognitive agency are distinctive issues for 
algorithmic systems. Strictly speaking, the answer is no, because—as we explain in chapter 1—
many of the arguments we advance in this book are applicable to a wide range of social and 
technical systems. However, there are several reasons to think that practical and cognitive 
agency raise issues worth analyzing in the context of algorithmic systems. For one, humans are 
well-adapted to understanding, regulating, and interacting with other humans and human 
systems, but the same is not true of artificial systems. Sven Nyholm has recently argued that 
there are a number of important moral issues that arise in the context human-robot interactions 
precisely because humans tend to attribute human-like features to robots, when in fact humans 
 
31 Thomas Hill, Jr., “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 18, no. 4 (December 1, 1984): 
251–67. 
32 Alan Rubel, “Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the Value of Rights, and Autonomy,” Law and Philosophy 
26, no. 2 (2007): 119–159. 
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have a poor grasp of what robots are like.33 The same can be said for algorithmic systems. 
Related is that the informational component of algorithmic systems may be more pronounced 
than it is for bureaucratic or other primarily human decisions. We may understand the limited, 
often arbitrary nature of human decisions. But infirmities of algorithmic systems may be harder 
for us to reckon, and we may lack the kinds of heuristics we can employ to understand human 
decision-making.   
The view so far is that information is important for practical agency and cognitive 
agency, and that claims to such information are grounded in autonomy. Surely, however, it isn’t 
the case that respecting autonomy requires providing any sort of information that happens to 
advance practical and cognitive agency. After all, some information may be difficult to provide, 
may be only modestly useful in fostering agency, or may undermine other kinds of interests. 
Moreover, some information may be important for exercising practical and cognitive agency, but 
no one has an obligation to provide it. If one wants to feel better by cooking healthier meals, 
information about ingredients, recipes, and techniques is important in exercising practical agency 
over one’s eating habits. However, it is not clear that anyone thwarts another person’s agency by 
failing to provide that information. What we need, then, is a set of criteria for determining if and 
when informational interests are substantial enough that persons have claims to that information 
on the grounds of practical agency or cognitive agency. 
 
33 Nyholm, Humans and Robots, 15–18. 
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4.2.1. Argument 1: practical agency  
The first set of criteria for determining whether persons have claims to information about 
automated decision systems echoes the criteria we advance in chapter 3. Specifically, whether an 
individual has a claim to information about some algorithmic decision system that affects their 
life will be function of that system’s reliability, the degree to which it tracks actions for which 
they are responsible, and the stakes of the decision.  
Assume for a moment that Taylor’s problems happen in the context of a reporting system 
that people can’t reasonably reject on grounds of reliability, responsibility, and stakes. Taylor 
nonetheless has a claim based on practical agency. To effectively cope with the loss of her 
opportunities for employment and credit, she needs to understand the source of her negative 
reports. To that extent, Taylor’s claims to information based on practical agency resemble those 
of anyone who is subject to credit reports and background checks. And, of course, Taylor did 
indeed have access to very general information about the nature of background checks and credit 
reporting. That might have been sufficient to understand that her background check was a factor 
in her lost opportunity.  
We can capture this sense of Taylor’s claims with what we’ll call the 
Principle of Informed Practical Agency (PIPA): One has a 
defeasible claim to information about decision systems affecting 
one's life where (a) that information advances practical agency, (b) 
it advances practical agency because one's practical agency has 
been restricted by the operations of that system, (c) the effects of 
the decision system bear heavily on significant facets of one’s life, 
18 
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and (d) information about the decision system allows one to correct 
or mitigate its effects. 
Surely this principle holds, but it cannot capture the degree to which Taylor’s practical agency 
was thwarted by ChoicePoint and other reporting agencies. Rather, a key limitation on Taylor’s 
practical agency is the fact that the reporting agencies systemically included misinformation in 
her reports. In other words, Taylor’s claims to information are particularly weighty because the 
background checks at once purport to be grounded in information for which she is responsible 
(including criminal conduct) and the reports were systemically wrong. Hence, to capture the 
strength of Taylor’s claims, we can add the following:  
Strong Principle of Informed Practical Agency: a person’s 
claim to information based on the PIPA is stronger in case (e) the 
system purports to be based on factors for which a person is 
responsible, and (f) the system has errors (even if not so frequent 
that they, on their own, make it unendorseable).   
Knowing that the background checking system conflates the identities of people with similar 
names, knowing that her own record includes information pertaining to other people with 
criminal records, and knowing that the system relies on other background checking companies’ 
databases and thus re-populates her profile with mistaken information can provide Taylor with 
tools to address those mistakes. That is, she can better address the wrongs that have been visited 
upon her by having information about the system that makes those wrongs possible. To be clear, 
a greater flow of information to Taylor does not make the mistakes and harms to her any less 
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wrongful. Even if it is true that a system is otherwise justifiable, respecting autonomy demands 
support for practical agency so that people may address the infirmities of that system. 
What is key for understanding claims based on practical agency is the distinction we 
make in chapter 2 between local autonomy (the ability to make decisions about relatively narrow 
facets of one’s life according to one’s values and preferences) and global autonomy (the ability 
to structure larger facets of one’s life according to one’s values and preferences). In many 
contexts, respect for autonomy is local. Informed consent for undergoing a medical procedure, 
participating as a subject in research, agreeing to licensing agreements, and the like have to do 
with whether a person can act in a narrow set of circumstances. Our principles of practical 
agency, in contrast, concern aspects of autonomy that are comparatively global. One rarely (if 
ever) provides meaningful consent to having one’s data collected, shared, and analyzed for the 
purposes of background checks, and hence enjoys only a little local autonomy over that 
process.34 
Individuals have little (if any) power to avoid credit and background checks, and hence 
do not have global autonomy with respect to how they are treated. However, understanding how 
their information is used, whether there is incorrect information incorporated into background 
checks, and how that incorrect information precludes them from opportunities may be important 
(as in Taylor’s case) in order to prevent lack of local autonomy from becoming relatively more 
global. That is, mitigating the effects of algorithmic systems may allow one to claw back a 
 
34 Daniel J. Solove, “Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 126 (2013): 1880–
1903. 
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degree of global autonomy. And that ability to potentially exercise more global autonomy 
underwrites a moral claim to information.  
The two principles of informed practical agency only tell us so much. They cannot, for 
example, tell us precisely what information one needs. In Taylor’s case, practical agency requires 
understanding something about how the algorithmic systems deployed by ChoicePoint actually 
function, who uses them for what purposes, and how they absorb information (including false 
information) from a range of sources over which they exercise no control and minimal (if any) 
oversight. But other decision systems and other circumstances might require different kinds of 
information. The principles also cannot tell us exactly who needs to be afforded information. 
While the claim to information in this case is Taylor’s, it may be that her advocate, 
representative, fiduciary, or someone else should be the one who actually receives or accesses 
the relevant information. Taylor, for instance, might have a claim that her employer learn about 
the infirmities in ChoicePoint and Tenant Tracker’s algorithmic systems. The principles cannot 
tell us the conditions under which persons’ claims may be overridden. 
The principles discussed so far only address the epistemic side of practical agency. But 
Taylor is owed more than just information. We can see this by considering one of the most 
deeply troubling facets of her case: the reluctance that the data controllers who are involved have 
toward fixing her mistaken data. One effect of their reluctance is that it undercuts her ability to 
realize her values, something to which she has a legitimate claim. To capture this, we need—in 
addition to the principles of informed agency—a principle that lays bare agents’ claim to control: 
Principle of Informational Control: One has a defeasible claim 
to make corrections to false information fed into decision systems 
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affecting one's life where (a) one's practical agency has been 
restricted by the operations of that system, (b) the effects of the 
decision system bear heavily on significant facets of a person’s 
life, and (c) correcting information about the decision system 
allows one to correct or mitigate its effects. 
As before, we need a second principle specifying certain cases where this claim is stronger: 
Strong Principle of Informational Control: a person’s claim to 
correct information based on the PIC is stronger in case the system 
purports to be based on factors for which a person is responsible. 
These principles demand of the systems used in the Taylor’s case that she not only be able to 
learn what information a system is based on, but that she be able to contest that information 
when it is inaccurate. The claim she has in this case is (just like the principles of informed 
practical agency) grounded in her agency, i.e., her claim to decide what is valuable for herself 
and pursue those values so long as they are compatible with respect for the agency and autonomy 
of others.  
Now, the principles of informed practical agency and informational control cannot tell us 
what a person’s informational claims are in cases where they are unable to exercise practical 
agency. We consider that next.  
4.2.2. Argument 2: cognitive agency 
Cognitive agency can also ground a claim to information. Consider a difference between the 
Taylor and Arroyo cases. Or, more specifically, a difference between Taylor’s case once she had 
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experienced several iterations of problems with her background checks and Arroyo’s case after 
she’d been denied housing with her son. Taylor at some point became aware of a system that 
treats her poorly and for which she bears no responsibility. Arroyo, in contrast, was precluded 
from moving her son into her apartment for reasons she was unable to ascertain, the basis for the 
decision was an error, and the result was odious. Denying tenancy to Arroyo’s son Mikhail is 
surely an injustice. But that wrong is compounded by its obscurity, which precluded Arroyo from 
interpreting it properly. That obscurity violates what we’ll call the: 
Principle of Informed Cognitive Agency: One has a defeasible 
claim to information about decision systems affecting significant 
facets of a person's life (i.e., where the stakes are high).  
As before—and for familiar reasons—we will add a second, stronger principle: 
Strong Principle of Informed Cognitive Agency: a person’s 
claim to information based on the PICA is stronger in case the 
system purports to be based on factors for which a person is 
responsible. 
Arroyo is an agent capable of deciding for herself how to interpret the decision, and she deserves 
the opportunity to do so. Her ability to understand her situation is integral in her exercising 
cognitive agency, but the facts that are crucial for her understanding are that her ability to care 
for her son is a function of the vagaries of a background check system.  
Cognitive agency is implicated in Arroyo’s case in part because her predicament is based 
on a system that bears on an important facet of her life (being able to secure a place to live and 
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care for one’s child) and purports to be based on actions for which she is responsible (criminal 
conduct). The system, meanwhile, is such that it treats old charges as dispositive even though 
they were withdrawn, and as remaining dispositive regardless of whether the person is at present 
in any position to commit such a crime at all. The reason such facts about the background check 
system are important is not because they will allow Arroyo to act more effectively to mitigate its 
effects. She was unable to act effectively when she was precluded from moving her son into her 
apartment. Rather, those facts are important for Arroyo to be able to act as a cognitive agent by 
exercising evaluative control over what to believe and how to interpret the incident.  
Notice that the criteria for a claim to information based on cognitive agency appears less 
stringent than for practical agency. However, it does not follow that cognitive agency demands 
more information. Rather, cognitive agency demands different kinds of information. Because 
practical agency requires information sufficient to effectively act, it may require technical or 
operational information. Cognitive agency, in contrast, requires only enough information to 
exercise evaluative control. In the context of background checks, this might require only that one 
be able to learn that there is an algorithmic system underlying one’s score, that the system has 
important limitations, that it is relatively unregulated (as, say, compared to FICO credit score 
reporting), and the factors that are salient in determining outcomes.35 
Of course, that leaves us with the question of what information is necessary to exercise 
evaluative control. Our answer is whatever information is most morally salient, and the claim to 
information increases as the moral salience of information increases. So, in the case of Arroyo’s 
 
35 See also the discussion of counterfactual explanations in section 4.4.2. 
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background check, morally salient information includes the fact of an automated system 
conducting the check and the fact that her son’s current condition did not enter the assessment. It 
is true that there might be other morally salient information. For example, we can imagine a case 
where the future business plans of CoreLogic is peripherally morally salient to a case; however, a 
claim to that information is comparatively weaker, and hence more easily counterbalanced by 
claims CoreLogic has to privacy in its plans.  
4.2.3. Objections and democratic agency 
There are a several objections to the view we have set out so far that are important to address 
here. The first is that it proves too much. There are myriad and expanding ways that algorithmic 
systems affect our lives, and information about those systems bears upon our practical and 
cognitive agency in innumerable ways. Hence, the potential scope for individuals’ claims to 
information is vast.  
It is certainly true that the principles of informed practical agency and of informed 
cognitive agency are expansive. However, the principles have limitations that prevent them from 
justifying just any old claim to information. To begin, the principles of practical agency require 
that an algorithmic system restrict an individual’s practical agency. How to determine what 
counts as a restriction, of course, is an interpretative difficulty. For example, does an algorithmic 
system that calculates one’s insurance premiums restrict one’s practical agency? What about a 
system that sets the prices one is quoted for airline tickets? Nonetheless, even on a capacious 
interpretation, it won’t be just any algorithmic system that affects one’s practical agency. 
Another significant hurdle is that the algorithmic system must affect significant facets of a 
person’s life. Perhaps insurance rates and airline prices clear that hurdle, but it is close. Other 
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systems, such as what political ads one is served in election season, what music is recommended 
on Spotify, or which route Google maps suggests to your destination do not impose restrictions 
on one’s practical agency.36 The requirement that information allow a person to correct or 
mitigate the effects of an algorithmic system, therefore, is a substantial hurdle for the information 
to clear. Claims to information that have no such effect would fall under cognitive agency (and 
as we explain below, information that respects cognitive agency is less onerous to provide).  
A second, related, objection is that many people—probably most people—will not wish 
to use information to exercise practical or cognitive agency. It is cheap, so to speak, to posit a 
claim to information, but it is pricey for those who deploy algorithmic systems, and the actual 
payoff is limited. This criticism is true so far as it goes, but it is compatible with the principles 
we’ve offered. For one, the fact (if it is) that many people will not exercise practical agency does 
not say much in itself about the autonomy interests one might have in a piece of information. 
This is much the same as in the case of medical procedures: few people opt out of care, but 
information about care remains necessary to respecting their autonomy interests. Moreover, the 
objection speaks mostly to the strength of individuals’ claims. All else equal, the higher the 
stakes involved, and the more information can advance practical agency, the stronger the claims. 
And the more unwieldy it is for entities using algorithmic systems to provide information, the 
greater are countervailing considerations.   
 
36 There is a related question about the baseline against which some action counts as a restriction. A direction-
suggesting algorithm (e.g., Google Maps) in most cases increases one’s practical agency by allowing one to find 
one’s way quickly and easily. In the rare case that such a system sends one on a sub-optimal route, we could 
interpret that as a restriction of practical agency against a baseline of an overall expansion of practical agency. The 
best understanding of the principles of practical agency, though, is against a baseline of no algorithmic system.  
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A third objection is that the arguments prove too little. There is presumably a lot of 
information to which people have some sort of claim, but which does not advance individuals’ 
practical or cognitive agency. To introduce this objection, let’s start with a claim to information 
based on cognitive agency. Imagine a person (call him DJ) born into enormous advantage: 
wealth, social status, educational opportunities, political influence, and so forth. Suppose, 
however, that these advantages derive almost entirely from a range of execrable practices by 
DJ’s family and associates: child labor, knowingly inducing addiction to substances that harm 
individuals and hollow out communities, environmental degradation, and so forth. DJ’s parents, 
we might imagine, shield him from the sources of his advantage as he grows up, and when he 
reaches adulthood, he does not inherit any wealth (though of course he retains all the social, 
educational, and political benefits of his privileged upbringing). The degree to which his 
ignorance limits his practical agency is not clear, given his advantages.37 However, on the view 
we outline in the previous section, DJ’s parents certainly limit his cognitive agency by 
continuing to shield him from the sources of his advantage; he is precluded from understanding 
important facts about his life, as well as the chance to interpret his circumstances in light of those 
facts.    
DJ is not the only person whose cognitive agency is a function of understanding the 
source of enormous wealth and advantage. Anyone who has an interest in their society’s social, 
political, financial, and educational circumstances has some claim to understand how DJ’s 
family’s and associates’ actions bear upon those circumstances. And that is true regardless of 
 
37 To the extent that DJ wishes to steer his course on the basis his family and social background and reconcile that 
with his values and beliefs, shielding him may indeed limit his practical agency. 
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whether they are in any position to change things. In other words, it is the fact that DJ’s family’s 
actions have an important effect on the world that grounds others’ claims to information, not 
strictly how those actions affect each individual.38 But it is difficult to see how the importance of 
that information is a function of either practical or cognitive agency.  
With that in mind, let’s return to algorithmic systems. In path-breaking work, Latanya 
Sweeney examined Google’s AdSense algorithm, which served different advertisements, and 
different types of advertisements, based on names of search subjects.39 Sweeney’s project began 
with the observation that some advertisements appearing on pages of Google search results for 
individuals’ names suggested that the individuals had arrest records. The project revealed that the 
ads suggesting arrest records were more or less likely to appear based on whether a name used in 
the search was associated with a racial group. That is, advertisements suggesting arrest records 
appeared to show up more often in Google ads served for searches that included names 
associated with Black people than in ads served for searches that included names associated with 
White people. This result was independent of whether the searched names actually had arrest 
records.40 While Sweeney did not have access to the precise mechanism by which the AdSense 
algorithm learned to serve on the basis of race, as she explains, a machine learning system could 
achieve this result over time simply by some number of people clicking on ads suggesting arrest 
records that show up when they use Google to search for Black identifying names.41 
 
38 There might be plausible rationales for continued secrecy, e.g., privacy rights. But those are countervailing 
considerations to individuals’ autonomy interests—in this case grounded in cognitive agency. 
39 Latanya Sweeney, “Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery,” Communications of the ACM 56, no. 5 (January 28, 
2013): 44–54. 
40 Sweeney. 
41 Results from algorithmic systems that differ on the basis of race and ethnicity are rampant. Examples include 
predominantly sexualized images of women and girls returned for searches including “Black,” “Latina,” and 
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But what does this have to do with agency and information? After all, as Sweeney points 
out, the ads themselves may be well-attuned to their audiences, and it might be that search 
engines have a responsibility to ensure that their targeted advertising does not reflect race simply 
on the basis of harm prevention. But our argument here is different. It is that people have claims 
to information about some kinds of algorithmic systems even where their individual stake is 
relatively small, even where the system is reliable, and even where the system makes no 
assumptions about responsibility. So, while people who are White have relatively little personal 
stake in the issue of search engine advertising serving ads that suggest arrest records 
disproportionately to searches using Black-identifying names, they have an interest based in 
agency nonetheless. Specifically, they have an interest in exercising agency over areas of 
democratic concern.   
For the moment we will call this democratic agency, and define it as access to 
information that is important for persons to perform the legitimating function that is necessary to 
underwrite democratic authority. We will take up this facet of agency and autonomy in more 
detail in chapter 8. The gist of the idea is this. Whether a democratic state, set of policies, 
actions, regulatory regimes, and so forth is justifiable (or legitimate) is in important part a 
function of the autonomy of its citizens. Exercising the autonomy necessary to serve this 
 
“Asian,” but not “White,” searches for high-status positions returning images predominantly of White people (e.g., 
“CEO”), facial recognition and image enhancement technologies that are more accurate for images of White people 
than Black people, health risk assessment machine learning tools that underestimate Black patients’ eligibility for 
care interventions, and more. Jonathan Garvie and Clare Frankle, “Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a 
Racial Bias Problem,” The Atlantic, April 7, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-
underlying-bias-of-facial-recognition-systems/476991/; Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression : How 
Search Engines Reinforce Racism (New York: New York University Press, 2018); Ziad Obermeyer et al., 
“Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations,” Science 366, no. 6464 
(October 25, 2019): 447–53. While organizations often aim to rectify these disparities, those responses are often 
reactive. Moreover, knowledge of those processes is important to democratic agency and legitimation, the topic of 
chapter 8. 
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legitimating function requires certain kinds of information. Google of course is not a state actor, 
but it serves an outsized role in modern life, and understanding how that interacts with basic 
rights (including treatment of people based on race), is important for people to understand.   
4.3. Relation to the GDPR   
Having examined moral claims to information about algorithmic systems based on cognitive and 
practical agency, it will be useful to consider some of the scholarship on legal rights to 
information regarding algorithmic systems. Specifically, there is considerable scholarly 
discussion regarding informational rights in the context of the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation.42 Much of that discussion concerns whether the GDPR contains a “right 
to explanation,” and if so, what that right entails. There is, in contrast, much less scholarly 
attention devoted to what moral claims (if any) underwrite such a right. The claims to cognitive 
and practical agency that we have established can do that justificatory work. But before we get to 
that, we want to draw on some of the right to explanation scholarship for some important context 
and to make a few key distinctions.  
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the primary data protection and 
privacy regulation in European Union law. For our purposes, we wish to discuss four specific 
rights related to decision systems: the right of access (the right to access the information in one’s 
file), the right to rectification (the right to correct misinformation in one’s file), the right to 
explanation (the right to have automated decisions made about oneself explained), and the right 
 
42 European Union, “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),” 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 § (2016). 
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to object (the right not to be subject to a significant decision based solely on automated 
processing). 
4.3.1 The right of access and the right to rectification 
Article 15 of the GDPR outlines the right of access, which is the (legal) right of data subjects 
who are citizens of the EU to obtain from data controllers confirmation as to whether or not their 
personal data are being processed, confirmation that personal data shared with third parties is 
safeguarded, and to obtain a copy of personal data undergoing processing.43 Article 16 outlines 
the right to rectification, which is “the [legal] right to obtain from the controller without undue 
delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her.”44 These legal rights 
can be underwritten by the same ideas that support the principles of practical and cognitive 
agency and the principles of informational control, and we can use the principles to underwrite 
them. 
Begin with rectification. Where one’s data is being used to make decisions affecting 
significant facets of one’s life—such that the system restricts one’s agency—the principle of 
informational control tells us that there is a defeasible claim to correcting that information. 
Insofar as our data is being used to make decisions about us that will affect us, the right to 
rectification stands as a law that enjoys justification from this principle.  
With these ideas in place, we can also offer a justification for the right of access. To 
know whether a controller has incorrect information about us or information that we do not want 
 
43 European Union, pt. 15. 
44 European Union, pt. 16. 
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them to have or share, we need to know what information they in fact have about us. And so, if 
the right to rectification is to have value, we need a right of access. We can further support the 
right of access by reflection of the principles of practical and cognitive agency: often we will 
need to know what information is being collected in order to improve our prospects or to simply 
make sense of decisions being made about us.  
4.3.2 The right to explanation 
Consider next the right to have significant automated decisions explained. The Arroyo case 
brings out the importance of this right. To respond to their predicament, Carmen and Mikhail 
need to understand it. We begin with a general discussion of the right. 
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Luciano Floridi introduce two helpful distinctions 
for thinking about the right to explanation.45 The first of these distinctions disambiguates what is 
being explained. A “system-functional” explanation explains “the logic, significance, envisaged 
consequences and general functionality of an automated decision-making system.”46 In contrast, 
a “specific decision explains “the rationale, reasons, and individual circumstances of a specific 
automated decision.”47 Note that if a system is deterministic a complete description of system 
functionality might entail an explanation of a specific decision. So, in at least some cases, the 
distinction between the two kinds of explanation is not exclusive.48 
 
45 Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Luciano Floridi, “Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-
Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation,” International Data Privacy Law 7, no. 2 (May 
1, 2017): 76–99. 
46 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, 11. 
47 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, 11. 
48 Andrew D. Selbst and Julia Powles, “Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation,” International Data 
Privacy Law 7, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 233–42. 
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The second distinction disambiguates when the explanation is being given. An ex ante 
explanation occurs prior to when a decision has been made. An ex post explanation occurs after 
the decision has been made. Wachter et al. claim that ex ante explanations of specific decisions 
are not possible; a decision must be made before it is explained. As Andrew Selbst and Julia 
Powles point out, in the special case of a complete system-level explanation of a deterministic 
system, decisions are predictable and thus, ex ante explanations of those decisions are at least 
sometimes possible.49  
Rather than stake a claim in this dispute, we will take a pragmatic approach. We can say 
all we need to say about the right to explanation by discussing the three categories that Wachter 
et al. admit of (i.e., ex ante system-functional, ex post system functional, and ex post specific). If 
a subject has a right to an ex ante explanation of a specific decision, the arguments for such 
explanations will follow naturally from our arguments for specific explanations; the only issue 
that the right will turn on is whether such explanations are possible—an issue that we are not 
taking a stand on here. We think that, morally, the right to explanation could encompass any of 
the possibilities Wachter et al. outline. So, we will understand the right to explanation as the 
right to explanations about ex post specific decisions, ex ante system function, or ex post system 
function.  
Let us then work though some ideas about what our account says about the right to 
explanation. 
 
49 Selbst and Powles. 
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Ex ante system-functional explanations. Subjects of decisions that have not yet been 
made often have good reason to know how decisions of that sort will be made in the future. The 
principles of practical agency delineate some of these conditions. 
One way to see this is to return to Catherine Taylor. She now knows that because of her 
common name, systems that perform quick, automated searches are prone to making mistakes 
about her. Based on this, she has an interest in knowing how a given system might produce a 
report on her. If she knows a system is one that might produce a false report about her, she can 
save herself—and the purchaser of the report—quite a bit of trouble, either by insisting to 
ChoicePoint that more careful methods are used, or by preempting the erroneous results by 
providing an independent, high quality counter-report of her own. 
Ex post system-functional explanations: Subjects of decisions that have been made 
often have good reason to know how those decisions of that sort were made. These claims can be 
grounded in practical or cognitive agency.  
Consider Taylor again. If Taylor is denied a job and she learns that an automated 
background check was involved, she has reason to suspect that the automated check might have 
erroneously cost her the opportunity. For her, simply knowing the most general contours of how 
a system works is powerful information. This alone may be enough to allow her to get her 
application reviewed again, and she could not reasonably endorse a system where she is denied 
this minimal amount of information. But even if she cannot accomplish this—that is, even if the 
principle of informed practical agency is not activated because her situation is hopeless—she still 
has a claim, via the principle of informed cognitive agency, to gain an understanding of her 
situation.  
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Specific explanations: Finally, subjects of decisions often have good reason to know 
how those specific decisions were made. These claims can be grounded in practical agency. 
Recall Arroyo’s denial of housing. Something is wrong with Arroyo’s report, yet his 
mother does not (and cannot) know what it is. This leaves her especially vulnerable in defending 
her son, since she does not know what to defend him against. As the principle of informed 
practical agency demands, subjects of decisions that have been made should at least know 
enough about those decisions to respond to them if they have been made in error. 
We want to pause briefly to discuss a recent proposal pertaining to how specific 
explanations might be given, namely, via counterfactual explanations, which have been detailed 
extensively in a recent article by Wachter et al. An example of a counterfactual explanation, 
applied to the Arroyo case, is as follows 
“You have been denied tenancy because you have one criminal 
charge in your history; Were you to have had zero charges, you 
would have been granted tenancy.” 
Generalizing a bit, counterfactual explanations are explanations of the form “W occurred 
because X; Were Y to have been the case (instead of X), Z would have occurred (instead of W),” 
where W and Z are decisions and X and Y are two “close” states of affairs, identifying a small—
perhaps the smallest—change that would have yielded Z as opposed to W.  
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Counterfactual explanations have several virtues qua specific explanations. For one, they 
are easy to understand.50 They are efficient in communicating the important information users 
need to know to make sense of and respond to decisions that bear on them. Thus, such 
explanations are often sufficient for giving subjects what they are informationally owed. Another 
virtue is that they are relatively easy to compute, and so producing them at scale isn’t onerous: 
algorithms can be written for identifying the smallest change that would have made a difference 
with respect to the decision.51 Further, they communicate needed information without 
compromising the algorithms that underlie the decisions they explain; they offer explanations, as 
Wachter et al put it, “without opening the black box.”52 
Counterfactual explanations can serve as a useful tool for delivering what is demanded by 
the cognitive and practical agency of data subjects without running roughshod over the interests 
of their data controllers. Of course, such explanations won’t always meet these demands; they 
will only work in contexts where specific explanations are called for. And even then, they might 
not always offer everything an agent needs; for instance, one could imagine counterfactual 
explanations that are too theory laden to be useful, or one that is only informative against 
knowledge of myriad background conditions. Nevertheless, this style of explanation can be a 
very useful tool in meeting agents’ needs. Thus, they serve as a good example of a realistic tool 
for giving data subjects what they are informationally owed.  
 
50 S. Wachter, B. D. M. Mittelstadt, and C. Russell, “Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: 
Automated Decisions and the GDPR,” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 31, no. 2 (2018): 841–87. 
51 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell, 15–16. 
52 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell, “Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated 
Decisions and the GDPR.” 
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Let’s take stock of what our account has to say about the right to an explanation. We take 
it that the right to explanation is a defeasible right to meaningful ex post, ex ante, system-level 
and specific explanations of significant, automated decisions. Using our cases and principles, we 
have demonstrated how our account can underwrite a claim: as autonomous beings, we need to 
understand significant events in our lives in order to navigate the world so as to pursue our 
values; as autonomous beings, we have a duty to support each other's autonomy; so, if we are in 
control of information pertaining to significant decisions affecting someone’s life, we often owe 
it to them to make that information available.   
4.3.3 The right to object 
In addition to rights of access, rectification, and explanation, the GDPR outlines the right to 
object, “the right not to be subject to a [significant] decision based solely on automated 
processing.”53 As above, our interest is in understanding whether there is a moral right to object. 
However, examining a version of a legal right can help us make sense of moral claims. There are 
two key features of the right to object as it is stated in the GDPR.  
Note first that the right is vague. Specifically, the “based solely” condition, as well as the 
notion of significance, admits of vagueness. As Kaminski notes,  
One could interpret “based solely” to mean that any human 
involvement, even rubber-stamping, takes an algorithmic decision 
out of Article 22’s scope; or one could take a broader reading to 
 
53 European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), pt. 22. 
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cover all algorithmically-based decisions that occur without 
meaningful human involvement. Similarly, one could take a 
narrow reading of “[…] significant” effects to leave out, for 
example, behavioral advertising and price discrimination; or one 
could take a broader reading and include behavioral inferences and 
their use.54 
We will not focus too heavily on issues of vagueness here. However, it is important to note that 
the limiting condition of the right—as well as some of its content—is vague.  
Second, the right to object is ambiguous.55 It could be understood broadly: as a broad 
prohibition on decisions that are based solely on automated processing. The same right could 
also be understood narrowly: as an individual right that data subjects can summon, for the 
purposes of rejecting a particular algorithmic decision.56 Here, we won’t be interested in 
adjudicating which way to read Article 22 of the GDPR, because we regard both readings as 
supported by the same considerations that we cite in favor of the right to explanation.  
Human oversight of an automated decision system requires that the system be 
functionally intelligible to at least some humans (perhaps upon acquiring the relevant expertise). 
So, in a world where the broad reading is observed, each significant automated decision is 
intelligible to some human overseers. What this means, in turn, is that the reasons for its 
 
54 Margot E. Kaminski, “The Right to Explanation, Explained,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 34, no. 189 
(2019). 
55 Kaminski; Isak Mendoza and Lee Bygrave, “The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on 
Profiling,” in EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement, ed. Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou et al., 2017, 77–98. 
56 The terminology of broadness and narrowness is from Kaminski, “The Right to Explanation, Explained.” 
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decisions could be meaningfully explained to data subjects (or at the very least to their 
surrogates). The significance of this, from our point of view, is that it would help to secure the 
right to explanation, as it would require systems to be designed so that they are intelligible to 
humans. Further, in cases where a data subject cannot request an explanation, it serves to ensure 
them that significant automated decisions made about them make sense. Similarly, in a world 
where the narrow right is observed, systems are designed to be intelligible so that, were their 
decisions meaningfully checked by a human decision maker, they would make sense. This, of 
course, means that they are designed so that they do make sense to humans (even if those 
humans are experts). Further, like the broad reading, it also affords data subjects the opportunity 
to have decisions checked when they themselves cannot check them (perhaps for reasons of trade 
secrecy). However, the narrow right might sound more plausible than the broad right because it 
means fewer human decision makers would have to be employed to satisfy it, allowing systems 
to operate more efficiently. 
Now, unlike the previously mentioned rights, the right to object—particularly in its broad 
formulation—might sound onerous. However, abiding the rights to access, rectification, and 
explanation already requires that data controllers provide data subjects meaningful human 
oversight of decision made about them, so perhaps the broad right isn’t as implausible as it may 
first seem. Further, the broad right has the advantage that it makes the exercise of the right to 
object less costly to those individuals who would otherwise have to explicitly exercise it. We can 
imagine data subjects worrying that they will face prejudice for exercising the right; for instance, 
a job applicant might worry that if she exercised the right, the potential employer will think that 
she is going to cause trouble. 
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What does the right to object add, then? Importantly, there are systems where inferences 
must be kept secret—either to prevent subjects from gaming it, or because the system is simply 
too complicated—in these circumstances, the right to object plays the important role of ensuring 
that surrogates of data subjects understand whether high-stakes decisions made about those 
subjects make sense. 
4.4. Polestar cases 
We can finally return to the cases that provide our through-line through the book.57 
4.4.1. Loomis 
One of Loomis’s primary complaints in his appeal is that COMPAS is proprietary and hence not 
transparent. Specifically, he argued that this violated his right to have his sentence based on 
accurate information. He bases the argument in part on Gardner v. Florida.58 In Gardner, a trial 
court failed to disclose a presentence investigation report that formed part of the basis for a death 
sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the failure to disclose the report meant that 
there was key information underwriting the sentence which the defendant “had no opportunity to 
deny or explain.” Loomis argued that the same is true of the report in his case. Because the 
COMPAS assessment is proprietary59 and because there had not been a validation study of 
COMPAS’s accuracy in the state of Wisconsin (other states had conducted validation studies of 
 
57 For fuller description of our polestar cases see chapter 1 and see Alan Rubel, Clinton Castro, and Adam Pham  
“Algorithms, Agency, and Respect for Persons,” Social Theory & Practice 46(3) (July 2020): 547-572; 
https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202062497.  
58 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
59 Wisconsin v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2016). 
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the same system), Loomis argued that he was denied the opportunity to refute or explain his 
results.  
The Wisconsin supreme court disagreed. It noted that Northpointe’s Practitioner’s Guide 
to COMPAS explained the information used to generate scores, and that most of the information 
is either static (e.g., criminal history) or in Loomis’s control (e.g., questionnaire responses). 
Hence, the court reasoned, Loomis had sufficient information and the ability to assess the 
information forming the basis for the report, despite the algorithm itself being proprietary.60 As 
for Loomis's arguments that COMPAS was not validated in Wisconsin and that other studies 
criticize similar assessment tools, the court reasoned that cautionary notice was sufficient. Rather 
than prohibiting use of COMPAS outright, the court determined that presentence investigation 
reports using COMPAS should include some warnings about its limitations. 
According to the principles of practical agency, Loomis has a defeasible claim to 
information about COMPAS if (a) information about COMPAS advances his practical agency, 
(b) because COMPAS has restricted his practical agency, (c) COMPAS’s effects bear heavily on 
significant aspects of Loomis’s life, and (d) information about COMPAS allows Loomis to 
correct or mitigate the effects of COMPAS. If there is such a claim, it is strengthened (e) if 
COMPAS purports to be based on factors for which Loomis is responsible and (f) if COMPAS 
has errors.  
It is certainly plausible that COMPAS limits Loomis’s practical agency insofar as it had 
some role in his sentence. Loomis faced a number of decisions about what to do in response to 
 
60 Wisconsin v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d paragraphs 54–56. 
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his sentence. One is whether he should appeal and on what grounds. Another is whether he 
should try to generate public support for curtailing use of COMPAS. For Loomis, settling these 
questions about what to do depends on knowing how COMPAS generated his risk score. And 
there is much he doesn't know. He doesn't know whether the information fed into COMPAS was 
accurate. He doesn't know whether, and in what sense, COMPAS is fair. And he doesn’t know 
whether the algorithm was properly applied to his case. That lack of information curtails his 
practical agency. The length of his criminal sentence certainly involved a significant facet of his 
life, and it is at least plausible that greater information would allow him to mitigate COMPAS’s 
effects. The strength of his claims increases in light of the fact that it is best understood as being 
based on factors for which he is responsible, viz., his propensity to re-offend.  
So, Loomis has a prima facie and defeasible claim to information about COMPAS. But 
that leaves open just what kind of information he has a claim to, what that claim entails, and 
whether there are countervailing considerations that supersede Loomis’s claim. It would seem 
that Loomis needs to know that the data fed into COMPAS was accurate, evidence that 
COMPAS is in fact valid for his case, and, finally, some kind of explanation—perhaps in the 
form of a counterfactual explanation—that makes clear why he received the score that he did. 
Such information would advance Loomis’ practical agency, either by giving him the information 
needed to put together an appeal or by demonstrating to his satisfaction that his COMPAS score 
was valid, allowing him to focus his efforts elsewhere.  
Independent of the concerns based on practical agency, Loomis has a claim to 
information based on cognitive agency. Both factors in the Principle of Informed Cognitive 
Agency are present. COMPAS purports to be based on factors for which Loomis is responsible, 
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and the stakes are high. Being imprisoned is among the most momentous things that may happen 
to a person and understanding the basis of a prison sentence is essential to one’s agency. That 
extends beyond the factors that matter in determining one’s sentence to include whether the 
process by which one is sentenced is fair.  And as we have argued, agents have a claim to 
understand important facets of their situations. Hence, Loomis has a claim based on cognitive 
agency to better understand the grounds for his imprisonment.  
While Loomis plausibly has claims to information based on both practical and cognitive 
agency, there are differences in what those claims entail. While practical agency will only 
underwrite information that can be used in advancing Loomis’s case—and hence, mostly 
supports information for Loomis’s legal representation—cognitive agency underwrites the 
provision of certain pieces of information to Loomis himself. It would involve providing him 
information about the fact that a proprietary algorithm is involved in the system, information 
about how well the system predicts re-offense, and information about the specific factors that led 
to Loomis’s sentence. There is no reason to think that it would advance Loomis’s cognitive 
agency to provide him with specific information about how COMPAS functions.  
Moreover, the court did, in fact, respect Loomis’s cognitive agency. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the circuit court’s decision in substantial part because the circuit court 
articulated its own reasons for sentencing Loomis as it did. In other words, it provided an 
account sufficient for Loomis to exercise evaluative control with respect to his reactive attitudes 
toward the decision and sentence. 
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4.4.2. Wagner and Houston Schools 
The principles of informed practical agency and informed cognitive agency also aid our 
understanding of the K-12 teacher cases, especially Houston Schools. Recall that Houston 
Schools uses a VAM called EVAAS, which produces each individual teacher’s score by 
referencing data about all teachers.61 This practice makes EVAAS’s scores highly 
interdependent. Recall also that Houston Schools was frank in admitting that it would not change 
faulty information because it would require a costly re-analysis for the whole school district, and 
the potential to change all teachers’ scores. This all was despite warnings (as we note in chapters 
1 and 3) that value added models have substantial standard errors.62 So, EVAAS’s scores are 
extremely fragile, produced without independent oversight, and cannot be corroborated by 
teachers (or the district or, recall, an expert who was unable to replicate them). 
It seems clear enough that information about EVAAS is vital for teachers to exercise 
practical agency. Certainly, it is relevant to several significant aspects of teachers’ lives. For 
teachers who were fired or did not have their contracts renewed based on low performance, 
gaining an understanding of the system advances their practical agency in a couple of ways. It 
gives them (and their union leaders and lawyers) the bases of either an appeal (whether in court 
or to the public) of the firings or an appeal of the system altogether. It also gives teachers who 
are finding employment in other schools some context that could help them convince 
administrators that their departure from HISD was not evidence of poor teaching. That is, 
affected teachers have a (defeasible) claim to information about EVAAS’s functioning, because 
 
61 Houston Fed of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Ind Sch Dist, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
62 David Morganstein and Ron Wasserstein, “ASA Statement on Value-Added Models,” Statistics and Public Policy 
1, no. 1 (December 22, 2014): 7. 
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it could allow them to correct or mitigate the system’s effects. Their claim is strengthened 
because EVAAS purports to be based on factors for which the teachers are responsible (viz., 
their work in the classroom), and yet (as HISD admits) EVAAS has errors. These claims also 
underwrite teachers’ claims to informational control, specifically their claim to have any 
inaccuracies reflected in their scores corrected. 
The fact that EVAAS affects such important parts of teachers’ lives and purports to be 
based on factors for which they are responsible also gives them a claim to information based in 
cognitive agency. As in the COMPAS case, the type of information necessary for teachers to 
exercise evaluative control—that is, to assess their treatment at the hands of their school 
system—may be different from the information necessary for them to exercise practical agency. 
Cognitive agency may only require higher-level information about how EVAAS works, a frank 
assessment of its flaws, and a candid accounting of Houston Schools’ unwillingness to incur the 
cost of correcting errors rather than the more detailed information necessary for teachers to 
correct errors. To put a bookend on the importance of cognitive agency, we will return to an 
exemplary teacher’s public reaction to the VAM used by DC Schools: “I am baffled how I teach 
every day with talent, commitment, and vigor to surpass the standards set for me, yet this is not 
reflected in my final IMPACT score.”63 This would seem to be an appeal to exercise evaluative 
control. 
 
63 Valerie Strauss, “D.C. Teacher Tells Chancellor Why IMPACT Evaluation Is Unfair,” Washington Post, August 
16, 2011, sec. Local. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
In chapter 2, we argued that autonomy ranges beyond the ability to make choices. Properly 
understood, self-governance includes competence and authenticity and substantive 
independence, and it demands acting accord with others. Chapter 3 examined the requirements 
for respecting persons’ autonomy related to their material conditions. In the present chapter, we 
explain the informational requirements of autonomy. Specifically, we argued that autonomy 
demands respect for both practical and cognitive agency. We articulated several principles of 
practical and cognitive agency and argued that those principles could underwrite key provisions 
in the GDPR. Finally, we explained that those principles entail that the subjects of our polestar 
cases deserve substantial information regarding the algorithmic systems to which they are 
subject.   
Recall, though, that the organizing thesis of the book is that understanding the moral 
salience of algorithmic systems requires understanding how such systems relate to autonomy. 
That involves more than respecting the autonomy of persons who are, at the moment, 
autonomous. It also involves securing the conditions under which they can actually exercise 
autonomy. That’s the issue we turn to in next two chapters.  
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